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Abstract 
We report new evidence on the bank and institutional determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios in 28 
countries between 1999 and 2013. Overall, we find that smaller, more profitable, and highly liquid 
Islamic banks are more highly capitalized. Additionally, improvements in the economic and financial 
environments and market discipline within a country correspond with higher Islamic bank 
capitalization. The results shed light on the impact that Sharia’a law restrictions have on Islamic 
banking capitalization. Our findings are most robust to banks that choose to hold capital well in excess 
of that required by regulators, consistent with traditional capital structure theory. Our results highlight 
the role that stable economic and political systems play in improving bank capitalization and reducing 
financial sector risk. By reducing political instability and corruption, improving legal systems, and 
encouraging access to capital markets, policymakers may incentivize managers to make financing 
decisions that increase the capitalization of the Islamic banking industry in developing countries.    
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1. Introduction 
Considered as one of the fastest growing financial systems, Islamic banking is expanding rapidly 
in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Islamic bank assets are expected to reach $6.5 trillion by 
2020 (Mollah et al., 2016), with an annual growth rate of 19.7% from 2013 to 2018 (Ernst and Young, 
2013). Recent studies also show that these banks are becoming systematically important (Song and 
Oosthuizem, 2014) in a way that can play an important role in promoting financial inclusion and 
economic growth in Muslim countries (Imam and Kpodar, 2016). As a result, research has intensified 
to examine the effect of the development of this industry on bank risk (Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Abedifar et al., 2013), efficiency and profitability (Johnes et al., 2014; Jawadi, 2017), financial 
soundness (Beck et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 2017a), and corporate governance (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; 
Mollah et al., 2016), compared to conventional banks. However, this literature does not offer any 
empirical evidence on the determinants of Islamic banks’ capital decisions and whether they share 
common determinants with their conventional counterparts and the broader corporate finance literature.      
We choose to examine the determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions, because regulatory 
bodies, such as the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS) and the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) desire to enact appropriate bank capital requirements, among other measures, to 
control banking sector risk and governance. Previous research outlines the impact that firm-level and 
institutional characteristics have on the capital structure decisions of real sector firms (Fan et al. 2012, 
Öztekin and Flannery, 2012; Cho et al. 2014; Öztekin, 2015, Belkhir et al. 2016; Daher, 2017) and 
conventional banks. In the latter, Gropp and Heider (2010) provide evidence that most determinants of 
bank capital ratios are identical to those found in other corporate finance studies. Octavia and Brown 
(2010) reach the same conclusion, but also find that macroeconomic factors play a significant role in 
determining bank capital structure in developing countries. Recently, Anginer et al. (2016) examine the 
corporate governance determinants of bank capital structure and show that corporate governance is also 
an important determinant of bank capital decisions. Finally, Schepens (2016) concludes that reducing 
dependence on the tax shield can be a very useful tool for regulators in encouraging banks to rely more 
on equity funding.  
Thus, it is of interest to examine whether Islamic bank capital strategies are determined by the 
same factors observed in the above literature for two reasons. Firstly, several developing Islamic 
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countries are moving away from centrally-based economies toward more open economies and are, thus, 
connecting their banks and financial markets with the global financial system. Therefore, understanding 
the factors that drive the capital decisions of these banks and their impact on the local and global 
markets becomes increasingly important. Secondly, Islamic banks face unique capital structure 
restrictions due to Islamic law. In addition, they are often constrained by multiple banking regulatory 
standards (Bitar et al. 2017b), and they operate in an environment of relatively weak financial reforms 
(especially in the MENA region), compared to banks in industrialized countries (Belkhir et al. 2016; 
Bitar et al. 2017a). This is likely to affect the determinants of their capital ratios and, thereby, their 
optimal financing decisions.    
In this paper, we extend the literature to the Islamic banking sector in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) and South East Asian (SEA) regions and identify the determinants of Islamic bank 
capital ratios and whether the institutional environment, specifically economic and financial system 
development, affects Islamic bank capital decisions, and, if so, how. To empirically answer these 
questions, we select an initial sample of 149 Islamic banks from 33 countries located across both 
regions. The sample covers the period from 1999 to 2013. We apply traditional corporate finance 
theories and testing methodologies from the current literature to investigate the most relevant bank and 
institutional country-level determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions.  
Our results show that smaller, more profitable, and more liquid Islamic banks operating in 
countries with better institutional environments and market discipline have higher capital ratios, 
consistent with the idea that compliance with Sharia’a law requires holding higher liquidity buffers, 
especially for small Islamic banks that tend to utilize retained earnings to increase their capital ratios. 
Our results persist for Islamic banks that hold capital well in excess of the regulatory minimum, which 
is expected, since well capitalized banks are relatively free to choose the capital structures that 
managers perceive to be most optimal. On the other hand, our results are weakest for banks that hold 
the minimum required capital. So, we are less able to predict the capital structures of these banks, 
because they face regulatory and, perhaps, liquidity constraints. Using a first difference estimation 
technique, we also show that the changes in financial and institutional characteristics are important 
determinants of changes in Islamic bank capital structure decisions. Moreover, we find that the 
determinants of Islamic bank capital often change across periods of financial and political distress; 
however, the impact of bank size and institutional development remain generally consistent across 
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regimes. Most importantly, our results show that measures associated with economic and financial 
system development, such as low corruption, currency stability, rule of law, and market openness are 
consistently associated with higher capital ratios across specifications. Finally, our results are 
consistent when using an IV approach to control for endogeneity and alternative estimation techniques 
and standard error treatments.  
Our results contribute to the literatures on Islamic finance, developing markets, and the broader 
corporate finance capital structure literature in several important ways. First, we highlight the existence 
of a strong positive effect of the institutional environment on Islamic bank capital decisions. This could 
provide regulators and policy makers with an additional tool to create more favorable conditions in 
which to successfully implement the Basel III capital guidelines. Second, we show that other factors, 
such as democracy, legal origins, durability of political system, and market discipline have a profound 
influence on Islamic banks’ decisions to maintain higher capital ratios. Third, we add to the literature 
on Islamic banking and finance as it relates to the broader corporate finance capital structure literature. 
Using common bank-level measures, we empirically investigate the determinants of Islamic bank 
capital and find results similar to the broader corporate finance literature, which implies that standard 
capital structure theories and empirical results can be applied to Islamic banks (Gropp and Heider, 
2010; Cho et al., 2014; Belkhir et al., 2016; Schepens, 2016).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related 
theoretical framework and discusses the predicted bank and country-level effects on Islamic bank 
capital ratios. Section 3 describes our sample, variables, and empirical model. Section 4 presents the 
empirical findings. Section 5 reports sensitivity and additional analyses, and the last section concludes.  
2. The determinants of Islamic banks’ capital decisions 
2.1. Capital structure theories and Islamic banks 
The two most relevant capital structure theories in an Islamic banking context are the trade-off 
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) and pecking order theories (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Trade-off theory states that the optimal capital structure of a bank results from a trade-off 
between the costs and benefits of debt and equity financing. Accordingly, banks tend to use debt, rather 
than equity, to maximize their value (Belkhir et al. 2016). They use debt to benefit from the tax-shield 
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of interest deductibility. However, since banks have historically had a high share of leverage, compared 
to the rest of the economy, the tax shield may have a high cost, because leverage is directly associated 
with higher financial distress costs. Another example is the “agency hypothesis”, where a high 
dependency on leverage can discipline managers and mitigate agency problems, since debt must be 
repaid in order to avoid bankruptcy. In the case of Islamic banks, on the asset side, Sharia’a law 
requires financing activities to be backed by tangible assets, thus creating a safety net that helps reduce 
their risk exposure. In addition, Islamic banks have a higher share of tangible assets, compared to their 
conventional counterparts, which reduces the bankruptcy costs for liability claimholders. Furthermore, 
on the liability side, Sharia’a law imposes constraints on using debt instruments that correspond to 
Tier2 capital, which means that their Tier1 capital is almost equal to the capital adequacy ratio. For 
these reasons, the bankruptcy costs for Islamic banks is expected to be lower than that of conventional 
counterparts, because their business model favors the use of higher quality capital over debt when 
external funding is required.  
In contrast to trade-off theory, the pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) does not provide for any optimal capital structure. Due to information asymmetry between 
managers, shareholders, and outside investors, this theory suggests a predefined financial hierarchy of 
bank financing choices. Banks prioritize retained earnings as the best source of funds. If internal 
funding is not available, debt or convertible bonds will be used. Equity is considered the last resort, 
because managers often believe that the issuance of equity will be underpriced by the market (Belkhir 
et al., 2016). However, under Sharia’a law, Islamic banks are required to be fully transparent in their 
transactions. For instance, Sharia’a law prohibits gharar and, thus, information asymmetry between 
Islamic banks and stakeholders is not permitted. In addition, maysir, or excessive risk-taking, is not 
allowed, so many conventional banking practices, such as market speculation, securitization, and the 
use of other financial derivatives, are prohibited. Therefore, evaluating Islamic bank risk exposure 
should be less complex for external investors. Another principle for Islamic banks is the tangibility and 
traceability of assets. Therefore, all financial transactions by Islamic banks (e.g. murabaha, ijara, 
salam, and istisina’a) must be backed by tangible assets. In conventional banks, a borrower can – 
immorally and without notifying the bank – use the borrowed funds for activities other than that which 
was initially agreed. These activities often comprise higher risk engagement and, consequently, 
increases moral hazard problems. In Islamic banks, instead of providing a loan to a borrower to finance 
the purchase of an asset, the Islamic bank will buy or construct the asset in question and sell or rent it to 
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the borrower. This principle allows the Islamic bank to have a clearer view of the allocation of its 
resources. Moreover, Sharia’a law requires that these resources be invested in socially responsible 
activities that benefit community growth and development. Another important feature of Islamic banks 
is the profit and loss sharing contracts (e.g. musharaka and mudaraba) that are based on participatory 
finance and can also reduce moral hazard problems. Under the musharaka contract, Islamic banks are 
allowed to control the activities of the entrepreneur, while under the mudaraba contract, the Islamic 
bank encourages the entrepreneur to provide the needed effort to manage the project, since its 
repayment depends upon the experience and knowledge of the entrepreneur. Therefore, under Sharia’a 
law, Islamic banks will be less exposed to information asymmetry and the disadvantages related to the 
evaluation of and access to investors’ private information. As a result, the transparency, asset 
tangibility, and profit/loss sharing features of Islamic banks should reduce their risk exposure, 
information asymmetry, and use of debt, which will ultimately lead the bank to favor internal funds as 
a first choice in funding, followed by raising quality external capital.        
2.2. Bank-level determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions 
2.2.1. Size 
Both the corporate finance and conventional banking literatures agree that large firms and banks 
are more experienced, more reputable, have a more diversified portfolio of activities, and, thus, face 
lower default risk. They also have less volatile earnings, better access to capital markets, and can raise 
debt at lower costs. Thus, trade-off theory predicts a negative effect of bank size on bank capital. 
Islamic banks, however, suffer from several weaknesses, compared to conventional counterparts. They 
are less experienced, they cannot benefit from the use of debt instruments, and they often operate in an 
underdeveloped financial market. In addition, religious customers prefer not to deal with banking 
institutions at all, including Islamic banks, and instead choose to keep their wealth outside the financial 
system. Yet, the Islamic banking literature points to larger Islamic banks as having advantages in terms 
of experience, reputation, risk management, economies of scale, as well as information accessibility 
(Beck et al. 2013, Abedifar et al. 2013). In our analysis, we follow the standard corporate finance and 
conventional bank literature and use the natural logarithm of total assets as a measure of bank size. We 
expect a negative association between size and Islamic bank capital ratios.  
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2.2.2. Profitability  
There is no general consensus on the effect of profitability on firm and bank capital ratios. 
According to static trade-off theory, more profitable firms/banks are likely to have higher leverage 
ratios. Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that profitable firms face lower bankruptcy costs and can benefit 
from the tax shield to take on more debt. However, the authors explain that, in a dynamic framework1, 
profits can have a negative effect on leverage due to various frictions. According to pecking order 
theory, firms and banks prefer internal funds over external funds. Thus, the need for leverage is 
expected to be lower for highly profitable firms and banks. Islamic banks also prefer internal funds to 
finance their investments, because of the constraints imposed by Islamic law on the use of debt 
instruments. Therefore, they are left with two alternatives. The first is to rely on retained earnings, and 
the second is to raise equity, which could weaken shareholders’ control over the bank. Belkhir et al. 
(2016) explain that, in a pecking order context, managers are less motivated to raise equity, because it 
will be underpriced by the market due to information asymmetry. Moreover, raising debt or equity is 
related to the level of financial and economic development in a country. In most Islamic countries, the 
financial environment is still not well developed, making markets more prone to information 
asymmetry and transaction costs, which makes raising both debt and equity more expensive. In our 
empirical tests, we use net income-to-total assets as a measure of Islamic bank profitability and expect 
a positive impact of profitability on Islamic bank capital ratios.            
2.2.3. Liquidity  
Horváth et al. (2013) propose a financial fragility hypothesis under which an inverse relationship 
between capital and liquidity is expected. They argue that, under the trade-off hypothesis, regulatory 
constraints on capital will severely harm the liquidity position of a bank. Furthermore, banks with more 
liquid assets face lower bankruptcy costs and are more capable of raising debt, which could negatively 
affect their capital position. In contrast, pecking order theory suggests that having more liquid assets 
implies less information asymmetry and, therefore, a better capacity to raise equity (Belkhir et al., 
2016). Berger and Bouwman (2012) report similar findings by referring to the risk absorption 
hypothesis, under which highly capitalized banks generate more liquidity. In the case of Islamic banks, 
liquidity is considered a major challenge facing the industry. Islamic banks have constraints on 
                                                          
1 Compared to static trade-off theory that fixes a target leverage ratio, a dynamic trade-off theory tends to adjust a bank 
leverage position faster when macroeconomic conditions are in their favor.     
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accessing liquidity; they cannot use debt instruments or financial derivatives. Islamic banks also suffer 
from a weak interbank money market, lack of expertise, and inconsistent regulatory standards. As a 
result, they prefer to hold higher liquidity buffers than conventional banks, which could serve as 
protection against liquidity risk. Whether more liquidity leads to more or less Islamic bank capital is an 
empirical question, which we leave to empirical estimation. Due to data availability, we follow the 
Islamic banking literature and use the ratio of liquid assets-to-deposits and short term funding to 
measure Islamic bank liquidity.   
2.2.4. Asset Tangibility 
The availability of fixed assets means that firms and banks can raise more debt secured by those 
assets. Therefore, banks with more available tangible assets are expected to have lower bankruptcy 
costs and higher leverage ratios. Under pecking order theory, however, firms and banks with more 
available tangible assets are less sensitive to information asymmetry. This implies that the cost of 
issuing equity is expected to be lower than the cost of debt. Therefore, the presence of tangible assets is 
expected to be positively associated with capital ratios. Due to Sharia’a obligations, Islamic banking 
transactions should be backed by assets in the real economy. Tangible assets can create a security 
mechanism that can benefit Islamic banks during periods of financial stress, although a higher 
dependency on real estate can also negatively affect Islamic banks, if financial distress reaches the real 
economy (Bitar et al., 2017a). We use the ratio of fixed assets-to-total assets as a proxy for tangibility, 
and we expect a positive relationship between tangible assets and Islamic bank capital ratios. 
2.2.5. Risk 
Frank and Goyal (2009) explain that riskier firms with more volatile cash flows are expected to 
face higher costs of financial distress. Accordingly, stakeholders are less willing to invest in the 
company, and this will result in lower debt under trade-off theory (Belkhir et al., 2016). However, 
firms with more volatile cash flows can also exhibit adverse selection problems. If so, the pecking 
order theory predicts a positive effect of risk on firm leverage. The conventional banking literature 
mostly reports a positive relation between risk and bank capital ratios. Gropp and Heider (2010) argue 
that, when regulation constitutes the main reason for a departure from the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
paradigm, then regulatory authorities can explicitly intervene and force riskier banks to hold more 
equity capital. Due to the complexity of their facilities and contracts, Islamic banks could face moral 
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hazard problems, especially in the face of market imperfections and information asymmetries (Abedifar 
et al. 2013; Abdul-Karim et al., 2014). Islamic banks have less experienced risk management and are 
more prone to Sharia’a compliance risk, which can harm their reputation and investor confidence. The 
effect of bank risk on bank capital is an empirical question, which we leave to the empirical 
estimations. We follow the Islamic banking literature and use the ratio of net loans-to-assets to proxy 
for bank risk.   
2.3. Macroeconomic and institutional determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions 
To capture the role of economic, financial, and institutional development in each country and 
their effect on Islamic bank capital ratios, we use two sets of country-level control variables: 1) 
traditional macroeconomic determinants (i.e. GDP growth, inflation rate, and oil, mineral, and gas 
rents, all scaled by GDP); and 2) institutional development determinants (i.e. rule of law, government 
intervention, regulatory efficiency, market openness, and the overall index of economic and financial 
development). Because the financial and institutional environment is a large and complex concept, we 
argue that, although the components of the economic and financial development index cannot capture 
all the needed elements, we expect that such an indicator can play the needed role in capturing some of 
the critical dimensions of financial and institutional development.2      
2.3.1. Macroeconomic determinants  
We use five measures to control for potential differences in economic development at the country 
level. We first include the GDP growth rate and expect that raising equity is more favorable in periods 
of economic boom and expansion. This is because, in such period, stock prices are higher, expected 
bankruptcy costs are lower, and taxable income is higher. Accordingly, Islamic bank profits will 
increase and be held by banks as retained earnings in their capital buffers. Second, we use the inflation 
rate and expect a positive association with Islamic bank equity. According to the backward looking 
hypothesis, firm managers tend to raise more debt when they feel that interest rates are particularly low 
(Barry et al., 2008). Firms, banks, and individuals will borrow and invest more, leading to rapid growth 
and higher inflation rates. Conversely, when inflation rates are high, Central Banks often intervene and 
increase interest rates, forcing borrowers to borrow less, which decreases leverage and favors the use of 
                                                          
2 The robustness section of the paper also uses another indicator of economic and financial development, which is the 
Economic World Freedom Index collected from the Fraser Institute website of the Economic Freedom Network.  
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internal funds and raising equity. Finally, because many countries in our sample are rich in natural 
resources, we use three complementary measures, namely, oil, gas, and minerals rents, all scaled by 
GDP,3 and expect a positive association with Islamic bank capital ratios.    
2.3.2. Institutional determinants  
In this section, we provide insights on the role that the institutional environment might play in 
affecting Islamic bank capital ratios. We focus on the economic and financial development index and 
its different components. Specifically, we use rule of law to measure the capacity of a country’s 
government and legal system to recognize and ensure the protection of property and contract rights. We 
also control for the level of government intervention in the economy using an indicator of limited 
government, which measures fiscal freedom and government spending. Furthermore, in measuring 
regulatory efficiency, we control for three sub-measures: business freedom; labor freedom; and 
monetary freedom. Business freedom reflects the level of facilities related to the creation of businesses 
without any regulatory burden, such as constraints on licensing new businesses (e.g. high registration 
fees, long and complex registration procedures and bureaucracy) and rigid bankruptcy procedures. 
Labor freedom is defined as the ability of both employers and employees to agree to and sign contracts 
freely without government and union interventions to control salary, wages, hiring, and firing. 
Monetary freedom is related to a stable currency and a country’s monetary policy. Monetary policy can 
be used to reduce inflation and, thus, protect the nation’s wealth and its future investment and savings. 
In contrast, an inflationary policy reduces wealth and manifests in the form of an invisible tax that 
could distort prices, misallocate resources, and raise the cost of creating new businesses. Finally, we 
use an index of market openness to control for freedom of trade, freedom of investment, and financial 
freedom. These four measures constitute the economic and financial development index. The corporate 
finance and conventional banking literatures show different findings for the effect of the institutional 
environment on capital ratios. Some authors argue that firms and banks tend to favor debt over equity 
in countries where the institutional environment is well respected, while others find that firms and 
banks will prefer raising equity over debt.4 These results are often explained by referring to the level of 
information asymmetry in a country. For instance, Belkhir et al. (2016) find that, when institutions and 
                                                          
3 Oil, gas, and minerals rents are the difference between the value of oil, gas, and mineral production at world prices and the 
total costs of production. 
4 For more details, refer to Antoniou et al. (2008), Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011), Jõeveer (2013), Belkhir et al. (2016), 
and Schepens (2016). 
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individuals abide by the law, investors have more confidence in the system and are likely to accept 
extending credit to firms at better terms (Hanousek and Shamshur, 2011). In contrast, Antoniou et al. 
(2008) and Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011) suggest that strict enforcement of law and contracts 
leads to higher bankruptcy costs and lower leverage ratios. Although the Islamic banking system is 
bound by Sharia’a law, it operates in an environment that can be affected by weaknesses in the rule of 
law, governmental intervention, regulatory efficiency, and market openness. Belkhir et al. (2016) 
describe the institutional environment in the MENA region as weak and underdeveloped, compared to 
other developing countries. Therefore, the impact of the overall economic and financial development 
index and its components on Islamic bank capital ratios is an empirical question, which we leave to the 
empirical model. The overall index and each of its components range from 0 to 100, with higher values 
indicating a strong institutional environment. Table 1 summarizes the predicted effects of the different 
explanatory variables on capital ratios for firms, conventional banks, and Islamic banks. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample construction 
We use Bankscope as the primary source of data for this study (Abedifar et al., 2013; Anginer 
and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). We also utilize a Bloomberg database to sample 
market-based financial indicators. For each bank, we sample annual data from 1999 to 2013. Our initial 
sample includes more than 149 Islamic banks from 33 countries. Macroeconomic data, such as inflation 
and GDP growth rates, are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, whereas 
financial development and institutional variables are obtained from various sources, such as the 
Heritage Foundation, The Fraser Institute, and the CIA’s World Fact Book. We exclude countries, such 
as Brunei, the Cayman Islands, Gambia, Palestine, and Philippines, because they have no available data 
for the economic freedom index. We also exclude Islamic banks with negative capital ratios. Our final 
sample consists of more than 100 Islamic banks, operating in 28 countries. All variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
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3.2. Capital ratios and empirical model  
We follow Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) and use two 
definitions of the bank capitalization ratio. The first measure is bank common equity, divided by total 
assets (common equity/ta). Common equity includes common shares, retained earnings, reserves for 
general banking risks, and statutory reserves. The second measure is Tier 1 capital, divided by risk-
weighted assets and off-balance sheet exposures (Tier 1 capital/rwa). Tier 1 capital is the sum of 
shareholder funds and perpetual, noncumulative preference shares. This ratio must be at least 6% under 
the Basel III rules. We alternate between risk-weighted assets (regulated capital) and total assets 
(unregulated capital) to avoid any errors related to the calculation of risk-weighted assets (Cathcart et 
al. 2015; Dermine, 2015; Bitar et al. 2016). For our regression analysis, we employ a random-effect, 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) methodology to allow a more robust investigation of the impact of 
the determinants of Islamic banks capital ratios. Eq. (1) represents our base regression model:  
CAP_Islamicijt = α + β1 × Bank_Tradijt−1 + β1 × Institutional_detjt−1 + β3 × Macro_ecojt−1
+ ∑ β3 × YFEt
T
T=1
+ εit , (1) 
where CAP_Islamicijt is the capitalization ratio of bank i in country j at time t, Bank_Tradijt−1 
includes the bank determinants of capital structure, suggested by the traditional banking and corporate 
finance literatures, i.e. size, profitability, liquidity, asset tangibility, and risk. Institutional_detjt−1 is 
measured by the economic freedom index, which controls for rule of law, government size, regulatory 
efficiency, and market openness. Macro_ecojt−1 is measured by the GDP growth rate, the inflation rate, 
and oil rent, gas rent, and mineral rent, all scaled by GDP. These variables control for differences 
between country economies and investigate the impact of macroeconomic factors and natural resources 
on Islamic bank capital ratios. YFEt are the year fixed effects and capture the influence of aggregate 
(time-series) capital trends for the period between 1999 and 2013. ℰ𝑖𝑡 is a white-noise error term, 
assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, ℰ𝑖𝑡~iid N(0,σ
2). All 
independent variables are lagged one year, because they may take more than one year to impact 
banking capital. We follow Beck et al. (2013) and Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) and cluster at 
the bank level, instead of the country level, because some countries have a larger number of 
observations than others. Additionally, we only sample twenty-eight countries. Therefore, clustering at 
the country level may create biased results. 
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4. Empirical findings  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2, Panel A presents summary statistics for the capital ratios, economic development 
indexes, and bank and country-level financial characteristics for the 28 countries included in our 
sample. In general, they suggest that there is large cross-country variation in Islamic bank capital ratios. 
For instance, the Tier 1 capital ratio ranges from a minimum of 9.29% in Bangladesh to a maximum of 
75.18% in Singapore. Using the traditional common equity ratio, Bangladesh remains where Islamic 
banks are the least capitalized (mean of 6.27%), and Singapore remains the country with the most 
capitalized Islamic banks (mean of 74.28%). In Table 2, Panel B, we report that the number of 
observations varies dramatically between risk-based and non-risk-based capital measures. Tier 1 
capital-to-risk-weighted assets has 739 observations, while common equity-to-assets has 1,326 
observations. The number of missing observations is explained by the fact that most countries started 
reporting regulatory capital information in 2006, and some banks prefer not to provide information 
about their capital adequacy ratios and, instead, provide information about their traditional capital 
ratios. Banks in these countries may still be working under the Basel I accord, or prefer not to disclose 
information about their risk weighting.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The economic and financial development indexes also vary across countries. Excluding the 
United Kingdom and Singapore (the two most developed countries in our sample), Bahrain tends to 
rank towards the top of the economic index (I)5, with a mean value of 74.63%, whereas Iraq, Bosnia, 
and Bangladesh rank towards the bottom, with mean values of 16.8%, 48.53%, and 50%, respectively. 
Comparing capital ratios with the economic index (I), it is clear that economically developed countries, 
such as Bahrain, tend to have higher capital ratios.     
[Insert Figure 1.A and 1.B here] 
Fig. 1.A (Fig. 1.B) ranks the 28 countries according to the mean values of the economic and 
financial development index (I), as well as our main capital ratios. Both panels show that the economic 
                                                          
5 Economic index (I) represents the Heritage Foundation’s Economic freedom index, while Economic index (II) represents 
the Fraser institute’s Economic freedom in the world. Therefore, we add (I) and (II) to differentiate between both indicators.   
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index and capital ratios are higher during and after the subprime crisis period, suggesting more 
cautionary policies by governments and Islamic banks toward the widespread effect of the 2007 to 
2009 financial crisis. Fig. 1.A also confirms that many countries where Islamic banks operate suffer 
from weak financial development, compared to other countries, such as the UK and US.   
4.2. Determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios 
Table 3 reports the results estimating the determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios using Eq. 
(1). We use the common equity and Tier 1 capital ratios as dependent variables and introduce the 
different components of economic and financial development, as well as the overall index, in separate 
regressions to avoid multicollinearity. Models (5) and (10) control for macroeconomic conditions, 
while the remaining models control for the institutional environment and year fixed effects. We note 
some important results.  
First, we find a negative and significant association between bank size and both unregulated and 
regulated capital ratios, reflecting the Beck et al. (2013) and Abedifar et al. (2013) arguments that 
larger Islamic banks are more experienced and more reputable than smaller ones, thus they have lower 
capital ratios. Large Islamic banks also benefit from diversification and economies of scale, have lower 
bankruptcy costs, better access to capital markets, and are better positioned to access or develop 
Sharia’a compliant debt instruments and lever investment accounts. Another explanation is provided 
by Belkhir et al. (2016), who explain that information asymmetry between firm insiders and the capital 
markets is a major problem in the MENA region. Our results confirm their findings and suggest that 
large Islamic banks do not gain transparency as they grow larger; therefore, they rely less on raising 
equity, which strongly supports the trade-off theory and our expectation of a negative association 
between bank size and capital.  
We also find a positive and significant relationship between profitability and both unregulated 
and regulated capital ratios. Consistent with the pecking order theory and our expectations, the results 
persist in almost all models, reflecting the fact that Islamic banks rely more on retained earnings, 
especially if the economic and financial environment is still not well developed. In such cases, Islamic 
banks are more prone to information asymmetry and transaction costs, which makes raising either debt 
or equity more expensive. Also, the coefficient estimates of risk, measured using net loans-to-assets, 
show a negative, but not significant, association with Islamic bank unregulated and regulated capital 
ratios. The coefficient estimate becomes negative and significant only in Model 3, suggesting that 
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banks possessing important loan portfolios are less exposed to risk than banks that prefer to invest in 
derivatives, other types of securities, and non-traditional activities, thus reducing the need to hold more 
capital. In addition, the coefficient estimates reveal strong evidence of a positive and significant 
association between liquidity and bank capital ratios. For example, the findings suggest that a 1% 
increase in asset liquidity in Models (5) and (10) is associated with an increase in the common equity 
and Tier 1 capital ratios of 0.041 and 0.043, respectively. In line with pecking order theory and the risk 
absorption hypothesis, Islamic banks that hold more liquid assets are less exposed to information 
asymmetry and, therefore, have a better capacity to raise equity than less liquid Islamic banks. Finally, 
the coefficient estimate for asset tangibility is positive, but it is rarely significant across the models. 
Consistent with pecking order theory and expectations, the reliance of Islamic banks on asset-backed 
transactions and investments in real estate lead to a lower risk engagement and impede moral hazard 
problems. Therefore, the presence of tangible assets is positively associated with bank capital ratios. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
With regard to the institutional environment, we report that economic and financial development 
has a positive and significant impact on Islamic bank capital ratios. Accordingly, Islamic banks in 
countries that benefit from rule of law, limited and efficient government intervention, and open and 
competitive markets have higher unregulated and regulated capital ratios. The findings in Models (5) 
and (10) suggest that a 1% increase in the overall index corresponds with an increase in the common 
equity and Tier 1 capital ratios of 0.265 and 0.447, respectively. Our results confirm our expectation 
that Islamic bank decisions to increase capital ratios are strongly associated with property rights, the 
enforcement of contracts, fighting corruption, reducing tax payments and government spending, 
encouraging new businesses, the free movement of capital, the efficient allocation of resources, 
increased competition, and transparency of information. Altogether, these findings suggest that 
economic and financial development play a significant role in favoring equity capital over debt in the 
case of Islamic banks. As for the additional macroeconomic control variables, we find that Islamic 
banks operating in countries with higher oil rents have higher Tier1 capital, while Islamic banks 
operating in countries with lower mineral rents have higher common equity. The results, however, are 
not significant for the remainder of the macroeconomic variables.  
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4.3. Differences across periods of financial and political distress 
We now control for the fluctuation of the economy between periods of growth and financial 
distress and examine whether the determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios remain intact. Since our 
sample includes the subprime crisis period, Table 4 breakdowns the sample for the periods before 
(1999–2006), during (2007–2009), and after (2010–2013) the crisis. We report similar results, although 
some results become insignificant.   
Another important issue is that some countries where Islamic banks operate have witnessed 
significant economic and political instability due to the Arab Spring. While Gosh (2015) demonstrates 
that political instability has a negative effect on bank risk and performance, Bitar et al. (2017b) find 
that high capital ratios decreased risk and improved bank performance during the Arab Spring. We 
extend the work of both authors and investigate whether the determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios 
hold across economic and political cycles. We use two measures of political distress. The first measure, 
major protests, controls for countries characterized by major protests, such as Algeria and Bahrain, but 
did not experience major political change as a result. The second measure, Arab Spring, controls for 
countries characterized by major political changes that resulted in regime change, or civil war, such as 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. The results are also presented in Table 4 and provide three important 
insights. Firstly, the profitability ratio reports a significantly negative, or insignificant effect, on the 
bank common equity-to-assets and Tier1 capital ratios, respectively, perhaps because Islamic banks are 
using profits to distribute dividends, or pay higher returns to investment account holders and other 
depositors, instead of retaining earnings, as a signal of bank financial soundness during political 
distress periods. Secondly, risk is positively associated with bank capital, indicating that Islamic banks 
expect the default of some of their financial products during periods of political instability and, thus, 
tend to maintain higher capital ratios. Finally, the economic development index no longer exhibits a 
significant relationship with the Tier1 capital ratio, demonstrating that law and order policies cannot 
have a positive effect without the existence of a stable political system.       
[Insert Table 4 here] 
5. Robustness checks and further analyses  
In this section, we examine whether the determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios persist when 
we use alternative institutional control variables and alternative capital ratio measures. We also explore 
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the determinants of highly capitalized Islamic banks, compared to banks with capital ratios close to the 
regulatory minimum. Finally, we examine the determinants of changes in Islamic bank capital ratios 
and the role of legal and political systems.  
5.1. Alternative capital ratios and control variables 
In this section, we investigate whether our findings on the relation between financial 
development and the capital ratios of Islamic banks persist when we re-estimate our regression using 
alternative independent and dependent variables. First, we use the Fraser Institute index of economic 
freedom (II), instead of the Heritage Foundation economic freedom index (I), to control for institutional 
environment. The new index is the average of five sub-indexes (i.e. size of government, legal system 
and property rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation). The results 
presented in Table 5 continue to lend support to our previous findings. Small, more profitable, and 
highly liquid banks have higher unregulated and regulated capital ratios. As for the Fraser Institute’s 
economic and financial development index and its components, we also report a positive effect on 
Islamic bank capital ratios in almost all models, confirming our earlier results.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Second, we use total equity-to-assets and capital adequacy ratios as alternative dependent 
variables. The capital adequacy ratio is Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital, divided by risk-weighted assets and 
off-balance sheet exposures, and it must be at least 8% under the Basel III rules. Tier 2 capital is the 
sum of hybrid capital, subordinated debt, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves. Song and 
Oosthuizen (2014) and López-Majía et al. (2014) ascertain that Islamic banks have very small Tier 2 
capital ratios, because they are prohibited from instruments such as subordinated debt (e.g. junior 
security and subordinated loans) that require interest payments. Therefore, their capital adequacy ratios 
are not very different from their Tier1 capital ratios. The results presented in Table 6 are highly 
significant and the determinants of bank capital are not sensitive to alternative capital ratio measures, or 
different sets of institutional control variables.     
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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5.2. The determinants of highly capitalized Islamic bank capital ratios  
We now investigate whether our findings are similar for highly capitalized banks. Berger et al. 
(2008) provide three arguments for being highly capitalized. First, higher capital ratios reflect higher 
retained earnings as a precautionary policy against future equity shortages. Second, banks are more 
sensitive to factors, such as earnings volatility, deposit shortfalls, charter values, and regulatory policies 
(e.g. too-big-to-fail), which create incentives for bank managers to adapt their capital ratios according 
to these factors. Finally, banks that plan to have future mergers prefer to maintain higher capital buffers 
to ensure regulatory approval. We define highly capitalized banks using a dummy variable that equals 
one if the bank’s Tier1 capital ratio exceeds its upper quantile (Q75) and zero otherwise. We use Eq. 
(2) to estimate the results, and Table 7 presents the findings for the initial and alternative measures of 
capital ratio. Since the dependent variable is now a binary variable, we use, in addition to GLS, logit 
and probit regressions to check the robustness of the results. We find that highly capitalized banks are 
smaller. Highly capitalized banks also have higher retained earnings, are more liquid, and have higher 
tangible asset ratios than smaller Islamic banks. This is logical, since small Islamic banks are 
constrained by Sharia’a law and are less capable of developing debt-based Sharia’a compliant 
instruments. Therefore, they prefer higher liquidity and rely on retained earnings to increase their 
capital ratios, instead of using external funds. Finally, the effect of the economic and financial 
development index suggests that Islamic banks tend to increase their capital ratios in countries with 
better institutional environments. In all, the results coincide with our main findings and suggest that 
these findings are driven by highly capitalized Islamic banks.  
Highly_CAPijt = α + β1 × Bank_Tradijt−1 + β1 × Institutional_detjt−1 + β3 × Macro_ecojt−1
+ ∑ β3 × YFEt
T
T=1
+ εit  (2) 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.3. The determinants of minimally capitalized Islamic bank capital ratios 
We complement the previous analysis by examining whether the determinants of Islamic bank 
capital ratios are similar when Tier1 capital and capital adequacy ratios are close to the minimum 
regulatory capital requirements. We use Eq. (3) to estimate the determinants of bank capital ratios, and 
Table 8 reports the results. In Eq. (3), we interact all independent variables with a dummy variable, 
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close, that is equal to one if the bank Tier1 capital and capital adequacy ratios are close to the minimum 
regulatory capital requirements. We employ two definitions of the close dummy. One corresponds to 
banks having less than the lower quantile (Q1) of the Tier1 capital ratio, and the other corresponds to 
banks having less than the lower quantile (Q1) of the capital adequacy ratio in the previous year. We 
choose to define close as banks with capital regulatory ratios below the lower quantile, instead of the 
minimum regulatory capital – equal to 4% for Tier1 capital and 8% for the capital adequacy ratio – 
required by the BCBS and the IFSB, because most Islamic banks prefer to hold regulatory capital ratios 
that are above the minimum imposed by both the BCBS and IFSB (Beck et al. 2013, Bitar et al. 
2017b). Furthermore, some countries, such as Bahrain, already require banks to hold minimum capital 
of 12%, well above the 8% recommended by both guidelines. We find that the determinants of capital 
ratios for Islamic banks with capital ratios approaching the minimum regulatory requirements are 
inconsistent for both unregulated and regulated capital ratios. For example, we find that bank size is 
now positively associated with Islamic bank capital ratios, while profitability, liquidity, and tangibility 
are each positively associated with the capital ratios of the least capitalized Islamic banks. These results 
reflect the leverage position of Islamic banks, where larger banks tend to adjust by increasing capital 
ratios when their regulatory capital approaches the minimum regulatory requirements. In addition, the 
negative associations for the other bank determinants suggest that Islamic banks with lower capital 
ratios (or higher leverage) become more fragile in terms of generating profits and benefit less from 
being more liquid and tangible, compared to highly capitalized (low leveraged) banks. Finally, the 
negative effect of the economic and financial development index indicates that Islamic banks with 
capital ratios close to the minimum capital requirements are bound to use leverage over equity in 
countries with better institutional environments.   
CAPIslamicijt = α + β1 × BankTradijt−1 + β1 × Institutionaldetjt−1 + β1 × BankTradijt−1 × Closeijt−1
+ β1 × Institutionaldetjt−1 × Closeijt−1 + β3 × Macro_ecojt−1 
 + ∑ β3 × YFEt
T
T=1
+ εit  (3) 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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5.4. The determinants of Islamic bank capital changes  
As we study the effect of the determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios, it also makes sense to 
examine how changes in those determinants can affect changes in Islamic bank capital ratios. For 
example, Barth et al. (2013) argue that it is interesting to explore the efficiency with which banks react 
to changes in regulatory reforms. Another reason for studying changes in capital ratios is that Islamic 
banks are often more capitalized than their conventional counterparts. Therefore, it is important to 
study how changes in the determinants affect the changes in capital ratios, in addition to their absolute 
values. We use a first difference estimation over three time intervals, corresponding to the periods 
before, during, and after the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, for all dependent and independent variables. 
For each bank, the variables are averaged for the three time periods. Due to the first differentiation 
estimation, the final sample contains observations for two out of three time periods. The findings are 
presented in Table 9 for our initial and alternative capital ratios, and the results provide several new 
insights. First, changes in bank size, profitability, liquidity, and asset tangibility have a positive and 
consistent effect on Islamic bank capital changes, suggesting that changes in bank financial 
characteristics in periods of financial distress have a direct effect on their common equity and Tier1 
capital ratios. Secondly, in contrast to our earlier findings, changes in the institutional environment 
might result in a negative effect on Islamic bank capital ratios. This may be explained by the fact that 
inconsistencies in economic and financial development in terms of rule of law, government 
intervention, regulation, and markets can be interpreted as a weak and unstable institutional 
environment, implying higher transaction costs and information asymmetries, making the cost of 
raising equity more expensive, relative to debt. Finally, changes in GDP growth correspond with higher 
capital ratios, while fluctuations in inflation rates result in a negative effect on bank capital. In addition, 
changes in both oil and mineral rents are negatively associated with bank capital changes, suggesting 
that oil and mineral fluctuations significantly impact Islamic bank capital ratios, especially risk-based 
capital ratios. This reflects the risk of a heavy reliance on oil and mineral industries within Islamic bank 
investment portfolios. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
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5.5. The effect of legal and political systems 
We examine the robustness of previous results by separating the sample into several sub samples, 
depending on country economic conditions and classifications, legal and political systems, as well as 
bank stability. First, we focus on the GCC countries, because they have the largest number of Islamic 
banks (Alqahtani et al., 2016; Ernst and Young, 2015). In addition, Bitar et al. (2017b) argue that banks 
in these countries tend to attract talented managers, skilled employees, and are working on developing 
their regulatory frameworks to enhance their risk management and improve their capacity to absorb 
financial shocks. Results presented in Table 10, Panel A, Models (1) and (6) report similar results, 
except the economic and financial development index is no longer significant, suggesting that 
additional efforts are required in terms of rule of law, regulatory environment, and market 
development, especially since the institutional environment in this region is still ranked behind the 
industrialized countries (Creane et al., 2004, Bitar et al., 2016). Second, Table 10, Panel A, Models (2) 
and (7) show no significant differences from previous results with regard to developing countries. 
Third, we categorize countries according to their legal systems: 1) western, which refers to the common 
and civil law countries; 2) hybrid, which refers to a mix between common or civil law and Sharia’a 
law (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey); and 3) Sharia’a, which refers to countries that fully adopt 
Islamic Sharia’a law (e.g. Iran and Saudi Arabia). Results presented in Panel A, Models (3) to (6), and 
(8) to (10) show that our previous findings are mostly driven by countries operating under hybrid legal 
systems, indicating that small and more profitable Islamic banks have higher capital ratios in countries 
with better institutional environments and hybrid legal systems. Fourth, we collect data on country 
political systems from the Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions of Polity IV project. We 
refer to two broad political systems: 1) highly democratic; and 2) highly autocratic.6  In addition, we 
refer to a measure of political durability to capture the stability and the durability of the political 
systems in different countries. The findings are reported in Table 10, Panel B and show no significant 
change in the effect of different explanatory variables on Islamic bank capital ratios across different 
political regimes, although the results are less significant when determining the Tier1 capital ratio. 
Finally, we separate highly stable7 Islamic banks from the other Islamic banks and find no significant 
                                                          
6 A democratic political system is mainly characterized by the freedom of expression, whereby all citizens have the right to 
express their opinion and choose their leaders. In contrast, the modern autocratic political system is characterized by a high 
degree of restriction or suppression of opposing political parties. It also exercises a high degree of directiveness over social 
and economic activities. 
7 Highly stable Islamic banks are banks with values that exceed the upper quantile of their three year rolling Z-score.  
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difference, although the coefficient estimates for bank level determinants appear to be more significant 
for highly stable Islamic banks.      
[Insert Table 10 here] 
5.6. The effect of publicly listed versus unlisted Islamic banks 
Aside from the previously mentioned effects, the determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions 
can also depend on market discipline. In fact, listing a bank in the public market implies more stringent 
rules and stricter capital regulation and supervision. Therefore, we divide the sample into publicly 
listed and unlisted Islamic banks. For listed banks, we refer to a Bloomberg database and use market-
to-book ratio and dividend per share as two market-based control variables to control for the market 
effect. We also use fee income-to-total operating income and non-interest income-to-total operating 
income to control for the Islamic bank business model and activity diversification. Results are reported 
in Table 11. We notice that the bank capitalization determinants are most significant for publicly listed 
banks, suggesting that the effect of bank size, profitability, risk, liquidity, tangibility and economic 
development on the capital ratios of Islamic banks is also driven by the disciplinary role that the 
financial markets play in the capital structure decisions of publicly listed Islamic banks, compared to 
unlisted Islamic banks.   
[Insert Table 11 here] 
5.7.  IV approach and other estimation techniques  
We verify the robustness of our results by addressing the issue of potential endogeneity and by 
employing alternative econometric specifications and standard error treatments. 
First, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to mitigate concerns of endogeneity. In an 
IV approach, we regress the economic and financial development characteristics on instruments and the 
other regressors, as reported in the base models (i.e. Table 2). Then, the predicted values of the 
economic development variable replace the index reported in base models. The current literature on 
Islamic bank financial characteristics is largely silent regarding endogeneity and lacks guidance on the 
specific instruments that can be used when examining the association between economic development 
and bank capital structure. In this study, we use the first and the second lagged values of the World 
Governance Index, as well as the rest of regressors, as instruments. Computed by the World Bank, the 
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World Governance Index, reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies 
worldwide. The index is basically the result of a survey by Kaufmann et al. (2006), reflecting the 
responses of a large number of enterprises, citizens, and experts in industrialized and developing 
countries. We use this index, because it captures the institutional environments that play a key role in 
shaping the financial development of economies. Moreover, we argue that it is less likely that changes 
in the World Governance Index would have a direct, immediate effect on contemporaneous Islamic 
bank capital decisions. Instead, it might affect bank capital through its impact on economic and 
financial development. We follow Barth et al. (2009) and conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous 
variables in the first-stage regressions. The null hypothesis of the test is that our instruments do not 
explain cross-sectional differences in capital regulatory guidelines and measures. We reject the null 
hypothesis at the 1% level in all models.8 The results of the second-stage regressions are reported in 
Table 12, Panel A. We use three estimation techniques for both capital ratios: (1) we use two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regression; (2) we also use limited information maximum likelihood (LIML); and 
(3) we utilize generalized method of moments (GMM). The results from the second stage regressions 
consistently show that smaller, more profitable, and highly liquid Islamic banks are more highly 
capitalized. In addition, better economic and financial environments within a country correspond with 
higher Islamic bank capitalization. These results provide additional support for our earlier findings and 
suggest that results are not driven by endogeneity.  
[Insert Table 12 here] 
Secondly, we employ four alternative econometric specifications and standards error treatments. 
In the first two estimations, we use truncated regressions to address any bias related to the upper and 
lower distribution of observations for the dependent variable and median quantile regression, because it 
provides more robust results to outliers and distributions with heavy tails. In the third and fourth 
estimations we focus on the standard errors and use a White procedure to correct the heteroscedasticity 
of the standard errors, as well bootstrapped standard errors using a random resample of 100 of the 
banks employed in our sample. Table 12, Panel B shows that the estimated coefficients for the 
independent variables report the same signs across all estimations and models, indicating that the 
effects of bank size, profitability, risk, liquidity, asset tangibility, and economic development on the 
                                                          
8 We do not claim that the lagged values of the world governance index are the best instrumental variables. Instead, we argue 
that these instruments can be effective in explaining countries’ institutional environments.   
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capital ratios of Islamic banks are unaffected by the use of different econometric specifications and 
standard error treatments.  
6. Policy implications and conclusion 
We utilize a sample of more than 100 Islamic banks, operating in 28 MENA and SEA countries 
from 1999 to 2013 to examine the determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions. We find that small, 
more profitable, and more liquid Islamic banks, operating in countries with better institutional 
environments and market discipline are better capitalized. Our results are mainly driven by highly 
capitalized Islamic banks. When Islamic banks hold capital at levels well above those required by 
regulators, their capital decisions appear to be driven by similar factors to those previously found in the 
corporate finance literature, which implies that highly capitalized Islamic banks are able to choose 
capital structure in ways consistent with established capital structure theory. However, when bank 
capitalization is near the regulatory minimum, results are inconsistent, implying that they face 
regulatory and liquidity constraints that change the way managers make financing decisions.  
Our results also highlight the important role that the institutional environment plays in 
determining Islamic bank capitalization. We find that improvements in measures of economic and 
financial development, such as legal system, property rights, currency stability, government corruption, 
and market openness, are positively associated with the capitalization of Islamic banks. In addition, we 
also find that the determinants of Islamic bank capital ratios are different across periods of financial 
and political distress, confirming the role that institutional environment plays in the stability of 
financial systems. The findings are robust to the use of alternative capital ratio measures, different 
measures of institutional development, endogeneity, alternative estimation techniques, and different 
subsamples of countries, ranked according to their legal and political systems.  
The results presented extend the literature on bank capitalization in developing and Islamic 
financial markets and has important policy implications. As current international financial markets and 
regulatory standards evolve in order to develop sound financial systems and bank governance, our 
results help explain how Islamic bank managers choose between debt and equity financing, especially 
in developing countries. Islamic bank preferences for internal funds and equity are likely related to the 
constraints imposed by Sharia’a law, which encourages Islamic banks to increase capital buffers, 
instead of utilizing leverage. More importantly, our results show that improvements in the political and 
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financial environments that allow for more social and economic freedom result in Islamic banks that 
are better capitalized, and this is especially true for smaller banks that traditionally have difficulty 
raising capital in underdeveloped economies.  
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Table 1  
Predicted effects of explanatory variables on bank capital: corporate/conventional banking vs. Islamic banking 
Categories Variables Corporate finance Conventional banking Islamic banking 
(predicted effect) 
Bank-Traditional determinants Size - - - 
 Profitability -/+ -/+ + 
 Liquidity -/+ -/+ ? 
 Tangibility + + + 
 Risk -/+ -/+ ? 
Macroeconomics GDP growth + + + 
 Inflation -/+ -/+ + 
 Oil rent n.a.  n.a. + 
 Mineral rent n.a.  n.a. + 
 Gas rent  n.a.  n.a. + 
Institutional environment  Rule of law -/+ -/+ ? 
  Limited Government n.a.  n.a. ? 
 Regulatory efficiency n.a.  n.a. ? 
 Open markets n.a.  n.a. ? 
 Economic development n.a.  n.a. ? 
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Table 2 
 Summary statistics for regression variables 
MEA represents the Middle East and Africa region, GCC represents the Gulf Cooperation Council region, SEA represents the South East Asia region, and EU represents the European Union region.  
 Common 
equity 
Tier 1 
capital 
Equity to 
assets 
Capital 
adequacy 
Size Profit 
 
Risk Liquidity Tangibility Eco. 
Dev.  (I) 
Eco. dev. 
(II) 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation 
 
Legal Oil 
Rent 
Gas 
Rent 
Miner. 
Rent 
Panel A. Summary statistics by region and country 
MEA 15.85 25.5 16.32 25.63 13.54 1.41 43.06 54.49 3.82 50.86 62.31 4.06 12.71 1.11 15.23 2.72 0.72 
Algeria 22.63 . 22.73 . 13.16 1.54 83.15 51.15 3.9 55.67 52 3.61 9 1 22.99 13.35 0.12 
Egypt 5.24 10.3 5.5 13.06 14.56 0.16 45.86 19.67 1.89 55.79 64.4 4.41 8.14 1 8.22 5.57 0.2 
Iraq 37.85 . 37.85 12.5 12.42 3.73 11.96 147.8 6.57 16.8 . 6.27 10.14 1 53.09 0.31 0 
Iran 13.01 17.3 13.56 16.71 16.03 1.47 60.22 30.33 3.59 42.15 60.28 3.96 18.04 2 25.87 6.83 0.65 
Jordan 11.56 31.74 11.58 33.63 14 0.88 46.07 42.9 1.56 66.7 75.21 5.26 4.76 1 0 0.23 1.26 
Kenya 21.72 24.77 21.94 25.88 11.61 -1.07 63.49 . 4.51 58.23 69.51 4.18 6.44 0 0 0 0.07 
Lebanon 32.71 . 32.79 18.01 11.58 -0.53 17.68 116.1 7.1 58.62 72.13 4.34 2.14 1 0 0 0 
Mauritania 25.5 . 25.5 . 11.44 1.5 51.33 58.98 7.27 53.19 61.2 4.37 6.14 1 4.35 0 25.22 
Pakistan 15.19 23.47 15.33 23.45 12.09 1.14 27.53 51.77 2.98 55.48 59.89 4.05 10.94 1 0.83 4.11 0.05 
Senegal 10.69 . 10.69 . 11.7 1.09 74.84 . 1.98 57.45 59.64 3.94 2.29 0 0 0.03 0.86 
South Africa 9 13.02 10.06 13.39 12.56 0.71 83.3 25.54 2.37 63.7 68.61 3.34 7.1 0 0.12 0.12 2.18 
Sudan 15.32 35.97 16.2 34.34 12.5 2.05 30.19 65.06 4.95 43.4 . 3.56 15.96 1 14.51 0 0.52 
Syria 18.34 48.43 18.08 51.35 13.17 0.44 25.36 111.3 3.04 44.8 56.89 3.05 7.01 1 22.11 3.48 0 
Tunisia 20.6 22.33 20.61 22.33 12.73 1.07 48.42 51.98 2.77 58.95 65.6 4.11 3.54 1 3.76 1.25 0.65 
Turkey 10.78 14.06 11.52 14.54 15.56 1.73 73.04 20.87 1.75 58.8 64.12 3.9 19.76 0 0.16 0.02 0.14 
Yemen 13.29 14.59 13.85 15.73 12.3 0.22 28.06 52.38 1.62 51.5 63.32 2.7 13.36 1 28.59 1.1 0 
GCC 33.72 29.76 35.22 30.82 14.32 1.44 45.88 65.02 2.42 70.14 75.88 5.41 7.73 1.09 26.82 7.48 0 
Bahrain 50.1 37.59 52.06 39.23 13.14 1.29 35.19 106.9 2.23 74.63 76.13 4.96 6.88 1 17.65 9.89 0 
Kuwait 25.7 25.7 28.08 26.57 14.73 0.74 33.21 41.09 5.18 66.17 74.11 4.63 10.1 1 49.39 2.52 0 
Qatar 20.52 21.98 21.06 22.33 15.46 3.06 58.77 37.36 0.72 65.15 76.42 11.31 8.89 1 30.17 16.14 0 
KSA 21.82 26.47 22.32 26.01 15.81 2.31 58.65 45.24 2.45 63.35 70.03 5.1 6.58 2 43.8 3.6 0.02 
UAE 14.01 19.66 14.72 21.87 15.43 1.1 62.78 28.68 1.74 68.51 77.34 4.55 7.96 1 20.59 3.84 0 
SEA 12.91 16.33 13.03 20.13 13.82 0.28 60.59 40.98 1.1 59.22 66.42 5.28 5.78 0.69 4.49 4.14 0.51 
Bangladesh 6.27 9.29 6.47 11.07 13.07 0 66.26 25.57 1.76 50 61.53 5.82 5.43 1 0.11 3.02 0 
Indonesia 19.23 18.13 19.24 29.15 13.09 1.17 65.47 68.18 1.53 54.75 64.47 5.11 10.67 0 4.14 2.63 1.65 
Malaysia 11.96 17.41 12.13 19.65 14.72 0.24 54.49 39.4 0.42 63.71 68.28 5.13 3.48 1 6.63 5.62 0.11 
Singapore 74.28 75.18 73.33 77.27 13.1 -2.12 54.75 93.85 0.23 87.59 86.82 5.77 0.87 0 0 0 0 
EU 39.65 39.79 47.72 46.96 12.35 -3.23 37.68 160.31 2.35 69.78 77.79 2.75 2.86 0 1.04 0.33 0.13 
Albania 23.39 . 20.96 . 10.91 -3.29 39.17 . 4.91 60.11 69.9 5.03 3.15 0 2.11 0.02 0.24 
Bosnia  32.21 . 32.37 19.12 11.76 -0.8 75.63 102.2 4.91 48.53 66.32 3.89 5.21 0 0 0 0.55 
UK 45.16 47.72 45.7 55.52 12.82 -4.16 19.87 183.6 0.95 77.51 81.49 1.9 2.2 0 1.02 0.49 0 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for the full sample 
N 1326 739 1327 838 1327 1324 1280 1237 1292 420 420 420 420 28 420 420 420 
Mean 20.94 24.17 21.6 26.02 13.77 0.99 47.92 57.55 2.79 59.85 68.36 4.65 9.4 0.96 15.38 4.26 0.46 
Min 3.78 7.7 4.04 9.43 10.76 -20.1 0.03 1.46 0 15.6 46.8 -33.1 -24.22 0 0 0 0 
Q1 7.47 12.16 7.71 13.59 12.33 0.37 28.49 20.56 0.67 53.2 62.5 3 3.37 1 2.72 0.26 0 
Median 12.31 16.45 13.03 17.89 13.83 1.03 52.45 35.01 1.79 60.4 68.4 4.92 7.8 1 13.07 3.21 0.01 
Q3 24.65 27 25.56 28 15.15 2.08 66.95 59.88 3.64 67.4 75.4 6.43 14.09 1 22.51 6.22 0.2 
Max 82.42 79.8 84.41 86 16.93 14.58 98.86 546.19 17.23 88.9 88.6 54.16 54.18 2 68.84 23.91 44.64 
SD 21.3 19.06 21.77 20.1 1.76 4.22 24.88 80.71 3.2 11.76 7.75 4.95 10.22 0.52 14.96 4.38 2.37 
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Table 3  
The determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions 
Variables Common equity to total assets  Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Logarithm total assets -2.27*** 
(0.708) 
-2.46*** 
(0.750) 
-2.788*** 
(0.783) 
-2.493*** 
(0.728) 
-2.036*** 
(0.531) 
 -3.273*** 
(0.821) 
-2.576*** 
(0.794) 
-3.052*** 
(0.798) 
-2.654*** 
(0.786) 
-2.746*** 
(0.726) 
Earning to assets 0.330** 
(0.141) 
0.321** 
(0.138) 
0.265*** 
(0.096) 
0.340** 
(0.136) 
0.292** 
(0.139) 
 0.413** 
(0.183) 
0.383** 
(0.177) 
0.520*** 
(0.189) 
0.388** 
(0.177) 
0.363** 
(0.148) 
Net loans to assets -0.017 
(0.030) 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
-0.055** 
(0.028) 
-0.004 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.030) 
 -0.037 
(0.052) 
-0.057 
(0.052) 
-0.054 
(0.060) 
-0.048 
(0.052) 
-0.026 
(0.053) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.039*** 
(0.0132) 
0.038*** 
(0.0127) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.039*** 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.0127) 
 0.038** 
(0.017) 
0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.036** 
(0.0164) 
0.038** 
(0.0163) 
0.043*** 
(0.016) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.278 
(0.214) 
0.208 
(0.232) 
0.432*** 
(0.146) 
0.215 
(0.233) 
0.242 
(0.248) 
 0.502 
(0.577) 
0.468 
(0.565) 
0.56 
(0.574) 
0.446 
(0.568) 
0.180 
(0.486) 
Rule of law 0.139** 
(0.064)  
    0.278*** 
(0.086) 
    
Limited Government 
 
-0.038 
(0.068) 
     0.089 
(0.079) 
   
Regulatory efficiency 
  
0.291*** 
(0.080) 
     0.393*** 
(0.127) 
  
Open markets 
  
 0.105* 
(0.054) 
     0.093 
(0.059) 
 
Economic development 
  
  0.265** 
(0.107) 
     0.447*** 
(0.137) 
GDP growth 
  
  0.071 
(0.062) 
     -0.079 
(0.073) 
Inflation     0.007 
(0.026) 
     -0.016 
(0.024) 
Oil rent     0.051 
(0.051) 
     0.19*** 
(0.067) 
Mineral rent     -0.086** 
(0.034) 
     0.214 
(0.232) 
Gas rent      0.178 
(0.135) 
     0.100 
(0.148) 
Constant 41.47*** 
(11.22) 
52.99*** 
(12.43) 
38.22*** 
(13.14) 
44.15*** 
(10.61) 
26.10*** 
(8.188) 
 54.63*** 
(12.16) 
51.04*** 
(12.65) 
36.71** 
(14.81) 
53.22*** 
(12.86) 
27.80*** 
(10.55) 
N 862 862 634 862 851  472 472 428 472 463 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.388 0.283 0.299 0.343 0.432  0.448 0.307 0.401 0.348 0.479 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
31 
 
 
 
Table 4  
Differences during the financial crisis and the Arab spring 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Variables Common equity to assets  Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
 Before During After Arab 
Spring 
No major 
effect 
Major 
protests 
No major 
effect 
 Before During After Arab 
Spring 
No major 
effect 
Major 
protests 
No major 
effect 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]  [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
Logarithm total assets -1.703* 
(0.875) 
-2.97*** 
(0.755) 
-3.49*** 
(0.581) 
-4.95*** 
(1.908) 
-1.92*** 
(0.525) 
-5.701*** 
(1.886) 
-1.901*** 
(0.533) 
 1.312 
(1.106) 
-3.48*** 
(1.123) 
-3.38*** 
(0.946) 
-6.51*** 
(0.962) 
-2.75*** 
(0.678) 
-5.672*** 
(1.245) 
-2.66*** 
(0.697) 
Earning to assets 0.913*** 
(0.243) 
0.39** 
(0.190) 
-0.111 
(0.103) 
-0.629** 
(0.277) 
0.415*** 
(0.152) 
-0.526*** 
(0.172) 
0.402** 
(0.158) 
 0.743 
(0.575) 
0.66*** 
(0.184) 
0.068 
(0.195) 
0.032 
(0.190) 
0.536*** 
(0.171) 
0.038 
(0.148) 
0.56*** 
(0.179) 
Net loans to assets 0.01 
(0.033) 
-0.15*** 
(0.058) 
0.001 
(0.034) 
0.171* 
(0.099) 
-0.014 
(0.029) 
0.154* 
(0.092) 
-0.013 
(0.033) 
 0.063 
(0.095) 
-0.124 
(0.095) 
-0.001 
(0.050) 
0.283** 
(0.142) 
-0.037 
(0.055) 
0.169* 
(0.101) 
-0.042 
(0.063) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.082*** 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.027** 
(0.010) 
0.067*** 
(0.014) 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
0.072*** 
(0.017) 
0.04*** 
(0.013) 
 0.165 
(0.119) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
0.053*** 
(0.013) 
0.126*** 
(0.022) 
0.035** 
(0.018) 
0.095*** 
(0.020) 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.177 
(0.237) 
0.261 
(0.361) 
0.586 
(0.418) 
0.306 
(0.660) 
0.235 
(0.265) 
0.641 
(0.817) 
0.224 
(0.265) 
 2.904*** 
(0.720) 
0.245 
(0.595) 
1.702* 
(0.945) 
1.478* 
(0.815) 
0.502 
(0.524) 
1.166 
(0.969) 
0.598 
(0.564) 
Economic development 0.168 
(0.120) 
0.441** 
(0.187) 
0.441*** 
(0.103) 
0.645* 
(0.337) 
0.245** 
(0.106) 
0.754** 
(0.303) 
0.239** 
(0.107) 
 0.561*** 
(0.154) 
0.481 
(0.295) 
0.404** 
(0.184) 
-0.325 
(0.198) 
0.443*** 
(0.128) 
-0.221 
(0.214) 
0.436*** 
(0.136) 
Constant 23.73** 
(11.33) 
41.08*** 
(14.88) 
37.29*** 
(7.278) 
33.83** 
(17.09) 
27.39*** 
(8.165) 
37.79 
(23.37) 
27.27*** 
(8.131) 
 -47.53** 
(20.92) 
44.60* 
(23.75) 
38.27*** 
(12.25) 
119.2*** 
(20.63) 
31.04*** 
(9.840) 
105.8*** 
(26.89) 
30.69*** 
(9.863) 
N 281 227 354 47 815 64 798  71 148 253 31 441 46 426 
Year dummy  No No No No No No No  No No No No No No No 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.389 0.333 0.391 0.624 0.39 0.616 0.377  0.581 0.405 0.434 0.798 0.41 0.687 0.41 
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Table 5  
The determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions: alternative institutional control variables   
Variables Common equity to total assets  Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Logarithm total assets -2.89*** 
(0.829) 
-3.61*** 
(0.851) 
-3.087*** 
(0.839) 
-2.754*** 
(0.776) 
-2.968*** 
(0.822) 
-2.842*** 
(0.625) 
 -2.958*** 
(0.867) 
-4.385*** 
(0.813) 
-3.200*** 
(0.822) 
-3.511*** 
(0.840) 
-3.326*** 
(0.772) 
-3.131*** 
(0.660) 
Earning to assets 0.315** 
(0.143) 
0.336** 
(0.133) 
0.296** 
(0.140) 
0.316** 
(0.144) 
0.322** 
(0.143) 
0.255* 
(0.136) 
 0.301** 
(0.142) 
0.375** 
(0.146) 
0.270* 
(0.142) 
0.349** 
(0.149) 
0.306** 
(0.149) 
0.232** 
(0.116) 
Net loans to assets -0.028 
(0.026) 
-0.026 
(0.025) 
-0.025 
(0.025) 
-0.03 
(0.027) 
-0.028 
(0.027) 
-0.033 
(0.027) 
 -0.106** 
(0.047) 
-0.087* 
(0.048) 
-0.094* 
(0.049) 
-0.105** 
(0.049) 
-0.097** 
(0.049) 
-0.079* 
(0.044) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.027** 
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.027** 
(0.011) 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
 0.026* 
(0.016) 
0.025* 
(0.015) 
0.026 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.016) 
0.024 
(0.015) 
0.029** 
(0.014) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.09 
(0.259) 
0.085 
(0.248) 
0.073 
(0.263) 
0.096 
(0.252) 
0.0710 
(0.254) 
0.051 
(0.280) 
 0.026* 
(0.016) 
0.032 
(0.435) 
0.034 
(0.435) 
0.071 
(0.431) 
0.096 
(0.447) 
-0.233 
(0.354) 
Size of government -0.051 
(0.069)  
     0.0698 
(0.102) 
     
Legal system and 
property rights   
0.263*** 
(0.075) 
      0.345*** 
(0.0834) 
    
Sound money  
  
0.149** 
(0.076) 
      0.162* 
(0.0852) 
   
Freedom to trade 
internationally    
 0.277*** 
(0.097) 
      0.444*** 
(0.148) 
  
Regulation 
  
  0.18*** 
(0.062) 
      0.284** 
(0.143) 
 
Economic development 
(II)   
   0.497*** 
(0.142) 
      0.77*** 
(0.209) 
GDP growth 
  
   0.017 
(0.059) 
      -0.123 
(0.080) 
Inflation      -0.001 
(0.029) 
      -0.032 
(0.030) 
Oil rent      0.069 
(0.064) 
      0.144* 
(0.079) 
Mineral rent      0.021 
(0.089) 
      0.077 
(0.216) 
Gas rent       0.031 
(0.140) 
      -0.098 
(0.160) 
Constant 62.24*** 
(14.65) 
53.72*** 
(12.08) 
49.87*** 
(12.61) 
37.72*** 
(13.56) 
46.97*** 
(13.49) 
22.59** 
(11.43) 
 63.17*** 
(17.27) 
67.03*** 
(12.20) 
58.33*** 
(13.05) 
44.25*** 
(14.35) 
51.49*** 
(16.94) 
13.42 
(12.51) 
N 764 764 764 764 764 755  427 427 428 427 427 418 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.292 0.438 0.345 0.346 0.30 0.429  0.304 0.48 0.387 0.431 0.361 0.498 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6  
The determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions: alternative capital ratios 
Variables Total equity to assets  Capital adequacy ratio 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Logarithm total assets -2.36*** 
(0.707) 
-1.92*** 
(0.544) 
-3.22*** 
(0.843) 
-2.75*** 
(0.638) 
 -3.18*** 
(0.920) 
-2.47*** 
(0.688) 
-3.99*** 
(0.994) 
-3.52*** 
(0.851) 
Earning to assets 0.342** 
(0.137) 
0.28** 
(0.140) 
0.306** 
(0.136) 
0.247* 
(0.137) 
 0.657*** 
(0.239) 
0.538** 
(0.210) 
0.576** 
(0.258) 
0.465** 
(0.227) 
Net loans to assets -0.009 
(0.030) 
-0.015 
(0.031) 
-0.027 
(0.027) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
 -0.099 
(0.063) 
-0.104 
(0.066) 
-0.119* 
(0.063) 
-0.13** 
(0.065) 
Liquid assets to deposits and short 
term funding 
0.040*** 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
 0.044*** 
(0.017) 
0.052*** 
(0.018) 
0.039** 
(0.019) 
0.044** 
(0.021) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.28 
(0.223) 
0.26 
(0.241) 
0.091 
(0.243) 
0.061 
(0.271) 
 0.592 
(0.588) 
0.276 
(0.582) 
0.328 
(0.595) 
0.143 
(0.631) 
Economic development (I) 0.302*** 
(0.112) 
0.286*** 
(0.108) 
   0.514*** 
(0.157) 
0.436*** 
(0.168) 
  
Economic development (II)   0.531*** 
(0.145) 
0.493*** 
(0.146) 
   0.825*** 
(0.226) 
0.712*** 
(0.209) 
Constant 30.33*** 
(11.51) 
23.59*** 
(8.242) 
27.66* 
(14.34) 
21.80* 
(11.46) 
 36.69* 
(19.86) 
30.03*** 
(11.36) 
25.00 
(22.21) 
26.24 
(16.11) 
N 862 851 764 755  529 520 481 472 
Year dummy  Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No 
Macroeconomics No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.384 0.442 0.378 0.438  0.441 0.45 0.46 0.479 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7  
The determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions: highly capitalized banks 
Variables Common equity to assets> Q3  Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
 
 
Model # 
GLS(Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
Logit (Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
Probit (Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
 GLS(Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
Logit (Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
Probit (Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Logarithm total assets -0.047*** 
(0.015) 
-0.059*** 
(0.012) 
-0.499** 
(0.232) 
-0.568*** 
(0.194) 
-0.247** 
(0.100) 
-0.308*** 
(0.0865) 
 -0.105*** 
(0.023) 
-0.097*** 
(0.021) 
-0.855*** 
(0.246) 
-1.079*** 
(0.258) 
-0.455*** 
(0.129) 
-0.599*** 
(0.140) 
Earning to assets 0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.144*** 
(0.051) 
0.107** 
(0.045) 
0.076*** 
(0.023) 
0.058*** 
(0.022) 
 0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.185** 
(0.086) 
0.137** 
(0.061) 
0.098*** 
(0.037) 
0.074** 
(0.030) 
Net loans to assets -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
 -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
0.141** 
(0.067) 
0.108* 
(0.065) 
0.081** 
(0.035) 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
 0.02 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.392* 
(0.210) 
0.286 
(0.196) 
0.198** 
(0.084) 
0.146* 
(0.083) 
Economic development 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.064 
(0.042) 
0.068* 
(0.041) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
0.035* 
(0.019) 
 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.111*** 
(0.038) 
0.172*** 
(0.039) 
0.0613*** 
(0.020) 
0.095*** 
(0.022) 
Constant 0.215 
(0.289) 
0.418* 
(0.216) 
-0.275 
(2.155) 
0.270 
(1.957) 
-0.259 
(1.140) 
0.199 
(1.097) 
 0.88** 
(0.424) 
0.80*** 
(0.303) 
3.248 
(4.257) 
1.122 
(3.790) 
1.538 
(2.204) 
0.643 
(2.023) 
N 862 851 862 851 862 851  472 463 442 463 442 463 
Year dummy  Yes No Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Macroeconomics No Yes No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.219 0.222 0.252 0.271 0.245 0.27  0.266 0.278 0.323 0.387 0.326 0.395 
Variables Total equity to assets   Capital adequacy ratio 
 GLS(Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
Logit (Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
Probit (Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
 GLS(Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
Logit (Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0 
Probit (Cap>Q3) =1 
otherwise 0  
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Logarithm total assets -0.0428*** 
(0.0141) 
-0.0577*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.461** 
(0.228) 
-0.562*** 
(0.195) 
-0.227** 
(0.097) 
-0.305*** 
(0.085) 
 -0.087*** 
(0.022) 
-0.086*** 
(0.019) 
-0.817*** 
(0.227) 
-0.935*** 
(0.243) 
-0.418*** 
(0.122) 
-0.479*** 
(0.126) 
Earning to assets 0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.128*** 
(0.049) 
0.105** 
(0.045) 
0.068*** 
(0.022) 
0.056*** 
(0.021) 
 0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.209** 
(0.082) 
0.17** 
(0.070) 
0.107*** 
(0.036) 
0.087*** 
(0.033) 
Net loans to assets -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
 -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.124** 
(0.059) 
0.093 
(0.060) 
0.072** 
(0.033) 
0.054 
(0.033) 
 0.019 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.363* 
(0.202) 
0.286 
(0.191) 
0.176** 
(0.079) 
0.141* 
(0.079) 
Economic development 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.061 
(0.043) 
0.063 
(0.041) 
0.029 
(0.019) 
0.032* 
(0.019) 
 0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.103*** 
(0.036) 
0.149*** 
(0.040) 
0.053*** 
(0.019) 
0.075*** 
(0.023) 
Constant 0.149 
(0.280) 
0.416* 
(0.216) 
-0.443 
(1.992) 
0.779 
(1.839) 
-0.330 
(1.068) 
0.452 
(1.039) 
 0.791** 
(0.400) 
0.741*** 
(0.286) 
2.682 
(3.757) 
0.741 
(3.294) 
1.312 
(1.932) 
0.338 
(1.711) 
N 862 851 862 851 862 851  529 520 529 520 529 520 
Year dummy  Yes No Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Macroeconomics No Yes No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.202 0.194 0.235 0.256 0.229 0.256  0.312 0.303 0.359 0.391 0.356 0.388 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 8  
The determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions: minimally capitalized banks 
Variables Common equity to assets  Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
 
 
Model # 
Close is < Q1 Tier 1 capital 
Close is < Q1 capital 
adequacy 
 Close is < Q1 Tier 1 
capital 
Close is < Q1 capital 
adequacy 
[1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Logarithm total assets -2.528*** 
(0.865) 
-1.515** 
(0.660) 
-3.59*** 
(0.969) 
-2.083*** 
(0.636) 
 -2.94*** 
(0.759) 
-3.307*** 
(0.911) 
-3.25*** 
(0.824) 
-2.990*** 
(0.678) 
Logarithm total assets 
×close 
1.081** 
(0.464) 
0.876* 
(0.515) 
1.971*** 
(0.743) 
1.989** 
(0.919) 
 1.217 
(0.745) 
1.237* 
(0.749) 
1.240* 
(0.670) 
1.408** 
(0.643) 
Earning to assets 0.430*** 
(0.154) 
0.297* 
(0.165) 
0.711*** 
(0.208) 
0.601*** 
(0.231) 
 0.428* 
(0.226) 
0.374* 
(0.195) 
0.499** 
(0.252) 
0.396* 
(0.212) 
Earning to assets 
×close 
-0.630** 
(0.314) 
-0.544 
(0.356) 
-1.06*** 
(0.348) 
-1.119*** 
(0.422) 
 -0.600** 
(0.278) 
-0.55* 
(0.296) 
-0.78*** 
(0.293) 
-0.722** 
(0.286) 
Net loans to assets -0.003 
(0.033) 
-0.019 
(0.032) 
-0.01 
(0.0340) 
-0.022 
(0.033) 
 -0.039 
(0.067) 
-0.023 
(0.071) 
-0.075 
(0.058) 
-0.065 
(0.060) 
Net loans to assets 
×close 
-0.033 
(0.029) 
-0.012 
(0.026) 
-0.081** 
(0.041) 
-0.06 
(0.048) 
 -0.042 
(0.051) 
-0.013 
(0.048) 
-0.013 
(0.042) 
-0.002 
(0.041) 
Liquid assets to deposits and 
short term funding 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.033*** 
(0.011) 
 0.029 
(0.019) 
0.035* 
(0.019) 
0.028 
(0.019) 
0.039* 
(0.019) 
Liquid assets to deposits and 
short term funding × close 
-0.02 
(0.024) 
-0.024 
(0.024) 
-0.042 
(0.026) 
-0.047 
(0.029) 
 -0.084** 
(0.038) 
-0.054 
(0.035) 
-0.059* 
(0.034) 
-0.064** 
(0.031) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.484 
(0.359) 
0.280 
(0.412) 
0.590 
(0.416) 
0.431 
(0.479) 
 0.955 
(0.746) 
0.517 
(0.725) 
0.635 
(0.662) 
0.088 
(0.565) 
Fixed assets to assets 
×close 
-0.909* 
(0.486) 
-0.551 
(0.511) 
-0.928* 
(0.547) 
-0.788 
(0.545) 
 -1.395* 
(0.800) 
-0.865 
(0.770) 
-1.048 
(0.725) 
-0.498 
(0.574) 
Economic development 0.505*** 
(0.131) 
0.408*** 
(0.120) 
0.482*** 
(0.119) 
0.441*** 
(0.112) 
 0.592*** 
(0.194) 
0.522*** 
(0.185) 
0.539*** 
(0.180) 
0.476*** 
(0.163) 
Economic development 
×close 
-0.206** 
(0.098) 
-0.183* 
(0.110) 
-0.369** 
(0.159) 
-0.396** 
(0.192) 
 -0.215 
(0.155) 
-0.260 
(0.161) 
-0.254* 
(0.139) 
-0.307** 
(0.131) 
Constant 17.92 
(11.41) 
7.770 
(8.579) 
35.67*** 
(13.78) 
14.42* 
(8.229) 
 23.30 
(14.49) 
30.13*** 
(11.46) 
34.10** 
(14.80) 
32.03*** 
(10.95) 
N 443 434 496 487  427 418 433 424 
Year dummy Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No 
Macroeconomics No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.446 0.464 0.398 0.437  0.426 0.472 0.418 0.463 
Variables Total equity to assets  Capital adequacy ratio 
 
Close is < Q1 Tier 1 capital 
Close is < Q1 capital 
adequacy 
 Close is < Q1 Tier 1 
capital 
Close is < Q1 capital 
adequacy 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Logarithm total assets -2.668*** 
(0.867) 
-1.67** 
(0.677) 
-3.75*** 
(0.993) 
-2.136*** 
(0.663) 
 -2.65*** 
(0.797) 
-2.587*** 
(0.798) 
-3.78*** 
(1.065) 
-3.488*** 
(0.762) 
Logarithm total assets 
×close 
1.111** 
(0.474) 
0.896* 
(0.521) 
1.933*** 
(0.733) 
1.956** 
(0.931) 
 1.378* 
(0.705) 
1.207* 
(0.714) 
2.828*** 
(1.059) 
3.054** 
(1.354) 
Earning to assets 0.377*** 
(0.145) 
0.255* 
(0.150) 
0.664*** 
(0.214) 
0.556** 
(0.238) 
 0.416** 
(0.211) 
0.328* 
(0.193) 
0.882*** 
(0.341) 
0.778** 
(0.327) 
Earning to assets 
×close 
-0.549** 
(0.274) 
-0.473 
(0.300) 
-0.98*** 
(0.326) 
-1.051** 
(0.409) 
 -0.605** 
(0.256) 
-0.535* 
(0.282) 
-1.43*** 
(0.469) 
-1.47*** 
(0.557) 
Net loans to assets 0.006 
(0.034) 
-0.011 
(0.032) 
-0.003 
(0.035) 
-0.017 
(0.033) 
 -0.044 
(0.061) 
-0.042 
(0.067) 
-0.079 
(0.058) 
-0.088 
(0.062) 
Net loans to assets 
×close 
-0.037 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.026) 
-0.087** 
(0.041) 
-0.064 
(0.049) 
 -0.044 
(0.047) 
-0.009 
(0.044) 
-0.055 
(0.059) 
-0.041 
(0.067) 
Liquid assets to deposits and 
short term funding 
0.023** 
(0.0101) 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.028*** 
(0.011) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
 0.03 
(0.019) 
0.038** 
(0.019) 
0.036* 
(0.019) 
0.044** 
(0.019) 
Liquid assets to deposits and 
short term funding × close 
-0.018 
(0.024) 
-0.024 
(0.025) 
-0.047* 
(0.028) 
-0.053* 
(0.030) 
 -0.092** 
(0.040) 
-0.068** 
(0.034) 
-0.079** 
(0.037) 
-0.089** 
(0.039) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.345 
(0.351) 
0.146 
(0.382) 
0.497 
(0.440) 
0.335 
(0.496) 
 0.748 
(0.676) 
0.272 
(0.645) 
1.064 
(0.773) 
0.552 
(0.767) 
Fixed assets to assets 
×close 
-0.735 
(0.486) 
-0.388 
(0.486) 
-0.858 
(0.552) 
-0.710 
(0.537) 
 -1.258* 
(0.719) 
-0.691 
(0.669) 
-1.795** 
(0.807) 
-1.292* 
(0.734) 
Economic development 0.526*** 
(0.128) 
0.430*** 
(0.119) 
0.476*** 
(0.119) 
0.437*** 
(0.116) 
 0.569*** 
(0.197) 
0.489*** 
(0.189) 
0.657*** 
(0.174) 
0.621*** 
(0.167) 
Economic development 
×close 
-0.217** 
(0.100) 
-0.189* 
(0.112) 
-0.354** 
(0.158) 
-0.383* 
(0.196) 
 -0.239 
(0.150) 
-0.247 
(0.156) 
-0.58*** 
(0.224) 
-0.647** 
(0.279) 
Constant 19.07* 
(11.52) 
8.942 
(9.374) 
38.99*** 
(14.28) 
15.68* 
(8.815) 
 22.06 
(17.17) 
24.69** 
(11.06) 
34.55* 
(19.15) 
31.98*** 
(11.76) 
N 443 434 496 487  434 425 480 471 
Year dummy Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No 
Macroeconomics No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.434 0.474 0.384 0.44  0.391 0.436 0.415 0.439 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level
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Table 9  
The determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions: first difference regression  
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  
Variables ∆ Common equity to assets ∆  Tier 1 capital to risk 
weighted assets 
 ∆ Total equity to assets ∆ Capital adequacy ratio 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
∆ Size -3.817*** 
(1.114) 
-3.479*** 
(1.139) 
-2.418** 
(0.970) 
-1.678* 
(0.939) 
 -3.699*** 
(1.106) 
-3.344*** 
(1.133) 
-2.502*** 
(0.922) 
-1.600* 
(0.857) 
∆ Earning to assets 0.599 
(0.366) 
0.487 
(0.366) 
0.837*** 
(0.283) 
0.62* 
(0.337) 
 0.605* 
(0.346) 
0.482 
(0.343) 
0.786*** 
(0.266) 
0.6* 
(0.338) 
∆ Net loans to assets -0.089 
(0.069) 
-0.088 
(0.068) 
-0.067 
(0.070) 
-0.042 
(0.073) 
 -0.086 
(0.069) 
-0.087 
(0.069) 
-0.145** 
(0.071) 
-0.103 
(0.065) 
∆ Liquid assets to deposits and 
short term funding 
0.05* 
(0.027) 
0.053** 
(0.027) 
0.064** 
(0.026) 
0.096*** 
(0.021) 
 0.057** 
(0.027) 
0.059** 
(0.027) 
0.066** 
(0.031) 
0.101*** 
(0.022) 
∆ Fixed assets to assets 1.094*** 
(0.413) 
1.112*** 
(0.406) 
2.265** 
(0.925) 
1.733** 
(0.807) 
 1.096*** 
(0.404) 
1.103*** 
(0.401) 
2.387*** 
(0.800) 
1.926*** 
(0.710) 
∆ Economic development -0.103 
(0.164) 
-0.118 
(0.182) 
-0.205 
(0.159) 
-0.503** 
(0.227) 
 -0.082 
(0.161) 
-0.117 
(0.177) 
-0.19 
(0.167) 
-0.43** 
(0.209) 
∆ GDP growth  0.594*** 
(0.190) 
 0.145 
(0.178) 
  0.596*** 
(0.191) 
 0.368* 
(0.217) 
∆ Inflation  -0.203** 
(0.089) 
 -0.005 
(0.084) 
  -0.202** 
(0.089) 
 -0.057 
(0.084) 
∆Oil rent  -0.266 
(0.229) 
 -0.721** 
(0.327) 
  -0.313 
(0.231) 
 -0.333* 
(0.187) 
∆ Mineral rent  -0.147 
(0.151) 
 -0.97*** 
(0.355) 
  -0.150 
(0.148) 
 -2.325** 
(0.957) 
∆ Gas rent   0.345 
(0.234) 
 -0.146 
(0.321) 
  0.269 
(0.240) 
 -0.127 
(0.276) 
Constant -0.038 
(0.074) 
0.005 
(0.063) 
-0.12 
(0.159) 
-0.175 
(0.155) 
 -0.056 
(0.077) 
-0.027 
(0.065) 
-0.094 
(0.146) 
-0.162 
(0.144) 
N 834 812 418 399  835 813 470 450 
Year dummy  No No No No  No No No No 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.344 0.4 0.38 0.464  0.44 0.401 0.417 0.511 
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Table 10  
The determinants of Islamic bank capital decisions: Legal and political systems 
Variables Common equity to total assets  Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
 GCC Developing Western 
legal 
system 
Hybrid 
legal 
system 
Sharia’a 
legal 
system 
 GCC Developing Western 
legal 
system 
Hybrid 
legal 
system 
Sharia’a 
legal 
system 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Logarithm total assets -6.72*** 
(1.606) 
-1.984*** 
(0.634) 
-4.284** 
(2.126) 
-2.77*** 
(0.714) 
-4.421*** 
(1.228) 
 -4.11*** 
(1.301) 
-3.119*** 
(0.735) 
-4.259 
(3.212) 
-3.926*** 
(0.735) 
0.789 
(2.848) 
Earning to assets 0.388** 
(0.166) 
0.449*** 
(0.149) 
0.0363 
(0.403) 
0.402*** 
(0.139) 
0.617** 
(0.308) 
 0.427** 
(0.198) 
0.519*** 
(0.185) 
-1.588 
(1.165) 
0.452*** 
(0.148) 
-0.244 
(0.487) 
Net loans to assets -0.054 
(0.047) 
-0.011 
(0.030) 
-0.075 
(0.140) 
-0.004 
(0.026) 
-0.019 
(0.041) 
 0.009 
(0.099) 
-0.053 
(0.055) 
0.313 
(0.192) 
-0.096** 
(0.049) 
-0.036 
(0.122) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.049*** 
(0.016) 
0.043*** 
(0.015) 
0.054* 
(0.026) 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
0.053*** 
(0.007) 
 0.058** 
(0.025) 
0.033** 
(0.016) 
0.048* 
(0.026) 
0.028 
(0.018) 
0.08*** 
(0.023) 
Fixed assets to assets -0.302 
(0.403) 
0.298 
(0.234) 
1.264*** 
(0.177) 
0.241 
(0.268) 
-0.243 
(0.334) 
 0.432 
(0.663) 
0.465 
(0.529) 
1.775 
(2.619) 
-0.092 
(0.396) 
5.389** 
(2.229) 
Economic development 0.442 
(0.273) 
0.258** 
(0.109) 
0.702 
(0.431) 
0.619*** 
(0.117) 
-0.015 
(0.272) 
 0.0546 
(0.330) 
0.411*** 
(0.120) 
1.417*** 
(0.414) 
0.42*** 
(0.125) 
0.473 
(0.299) 
Constant 93.13*** 
(32.89) 
25.97** 
(10.55) 
35.99 
(35.11) 
14.80* 
(8.860) 
83.57*** 
(22.54) 
 76.37** 
(35.01) 
39.07*** 
(13.62) 
-25.43 
(40.58) 
53.13*** 
(12.06) 
-31.39 
(48.53) 
N 243 829 106 602 154  180 460 57 378 37 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.641 0.381 0.514 0.559 0.548  0.546 0.42 0.79 0.436 0.939 
Variables Highly 
Democratic 
Highly 
Autocratic 
Durable Highly 
Stable 
The rest  Highly 
Democratic 
Highly 
Autocratic 
Durable Highly 
Stable 
The rest 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Logarithm total assets -4.563*** 
(1.413) 
-4.207*** 
(1.301) 
-6.18*** 
(1.628) 
-1.192** 
(0.573) 
-1.979** 
(0.790) 
 -2.323 
(1.547) 
-4.692*** 
(1.274) 
-4.846*** 
(1.639) 
-2.943*** 
(0.886) 
-2.515*** 
(0.878) 
Earning to assets 0.584* 
(0.303) 
0.334** 
(0.169) 
0.485*** 
(0.179) 
2.387*** 
(0.349) 
0.216* 
(0.123) 
 0.365 
(0.432) 
0.301 
(0.232) 
0.372 
(0.291) 
1.827*** 
(0.379) 
0.303** 
(0.150) 
Net loans to assets -0.032 
(0.050) 
0.001 
(0.042) 
0.045 
(0.045) 
0.0410 
(0.0388) 
-0.0321 
(0.0315) 
 -0.107 
(0.133) 
-0.019 
(0.099) 
0.037 
(0.096) 
0.0235 
(0.0664) 
-0.0138 
(0.0543) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.130*** 
(0.0307) 
0.0338*** 
(0.0127) 
 0.047 
(0.037) 
0.047** 
(0.023) 
0.045 
(0.028) 
0.161*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0471** 
(0.0204) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.753 
(0.713) 
-0.179 
(0.436) 
-0.449 
(0.342) 
0.985*** 
(0.269) 
0.139 
(0.297) 
 1.536 
(1.105) 
0.942 
(0.863) 
1.161 
(1.062) 
0.823 
(0.584) 
0.452 
(0.486) 
Economic development 0.672*** 
(0.233) 
0.526*** 
(0.110) 
0.711*** 
(0.158) 
0.249*** 
(0.0711) 
0.356*** 
(0.119) 
 0.444*** 
(0.138) 
-0.064 
(0.213) 
0.442 
(0.352) 
0.401*** 
(0.146) 
0.447*** 
(0.172) 
Constant 36.06* 
(20.23) 
47.61** 
(18.94) 
60.93** 
(24.06) 
5.079 
(11.82) 
23.20* 
(13.33) 
 25.12 
(29.65) 
94.75*** 
(24.41) 
58.96* 
(33.60) 
27.48 
(18.30) 
24.76* 
(13.35) 
N 266 311 246 207 536  189 184 174 105 313 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
R2 0.453 0.533 0.586 0.607 0.415  0.479 0.543 0.436 0.808 0.405 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 11  
The determinants of Islamic capital decisions: Listed vs. unlisted banks 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 Common equity to assets  Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
Variables Unlisted  Listed  Unlisted  Listed 
Model # [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5]  [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Logarithm total assets  -2.346*** 
(0.683) 
 -2.333*** 
(0.668) 
-2.441*** 
(0.684) 
-1.659* 
(0.836) 
-1.732** 
(0.793) 
 -5.918*** 
(1.549) 
 -2.568** 
(0.985) 
-2.699** 
(1.104) 
-2.691** 
(1.162) 
-2.977** 
(1.162) 
Earning to assets 0.514 
(0.321) 
 1.032*** 
(0.191) 
0.993*** 
(0.241) 
0.82*** 
(0.260) 
0.924*** 
(0.299) 
 0.495* 
(0.278) 
 1.322*** 
(0.414) 
1.331*** 
(0.420) 
1.393*** 
(0.427) 
1.706*** 
(0.334) 
Net loans to assets -0.029 
(0.069) 
 0.058 
(0.042) 
0.058 
(0.040) 
0.094** 
(0.043) 
0.102** 
(0.047) 
 -0.037 
(0.096) 
 0.068 
(0.061) 
0.054 
(0.063) 
0.042 
(0.057) 
0.052 
(0.052) 
Liquid assets to deposits and short term 
funding 
0.094*** 
(0.02) 
 0.012 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
0.024** 
(0.01) 
0.024** 
(0.01) 
 0.04 
(0.028) 
 0.095 
(0.089) 
0.092 
(0.091) 
0.111 
(0.096) 
0.078 
(0.084) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.852* 
(0.442) 
 0.251 
(0.36) 
0.281 
(0.437) 
0.410 
(0.397) 
0.407 
(0.411) 
 0.659 
(0.800) 
 1.825** 
(0.739) 
1.724** 
(0.727) 
1.694** 
(0.710) 
2.016*** 
(0.580) 
Economic development 0.371* 
(0.213) 
 0.716*** 
(0.0969) 
0.709*** 
(0.101) 
0.687*** 
(0.108) 
0.690*** 
(0.107) 
 0.648 
(0.411) 
 0.817*** 
(0.140) 
0.820*** 
(0.149) 
0.787*** 
(0.174) 
0.805*** 
(0.189) 
Market-to-book   2.597* 
(1.344) 
1.734 
(1.353) 
2.089 
(1.335) 
1.989 
(1.335) 
   0.820 
(1.845) 
-0.232 
(1.865) 
-0.476 
(1.872) 
-1.166 
(1.720) 
Dividend per share    0.455 
(0.317) 
0.436 
(0.328) 
0.378 
(0.347) 
    -0.444 
(0.290) 
-0.477 
(0.297) 
-0.627* 
(0.327) 
Fee income to total operating income     2.471 
(4.314) 
4.688 
(4.290) 
     -2.138 
(5.450) 
8.674 
(5.494) 
Non-interest income to total operating 
income 
     -2.610 
(3.026) 
      -12.70* 
(6.863) 
Constant 25.82 
(16.79) 
 -3.489 
(10.33) 
-0.575 
(10.86) 
-16.75 
(10.73) 
-15.81 
(10.17) 
 59.39* 
(33.19) 
 -7.260 
(13.50) 
2.071 
(15.46) 
5.343 
(14.64) 
11.95 
(11.89) 
N 476  171 164 159 159  248  145 140 138 138 
Country level No  No No No No  No  No No No No 
Year dummy  Yes  Yes No Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.4114  0.4955 0.4795 0.4637 0.4675  0.4604  0.5779 0.5899 0.5857 0.6222 
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Table 12  
Additional analysis: IV approach and other estimation techniques 
 Panel A. Instrumental variables to address endogeneity concerns 
Common equity to assets  Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets 
Variables 2SLS LIML GMM  2SLS LIML GMM 
Model # [1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] [6] 
Logarithm total assets -1.961*** 
(0.258) 
-1.96*** 
(0.258) 
-1.884*** 
(0.252) 
 -3.893*** 
(0.658) 
-3.901*** 
(0.662) 
-3.917*** 
(0.656) 
Earning to assets 
 
0.577** 
(0.260) 
0.576** 
(0.260) 
0.597** 
(0.262) 
 0.933*** 
(0.254) 
0.935*** 
(0.255) 
0.988*** 
(0.253) 
Net loans to assets 
 
-0.032 
(0.026) 
-0.032 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.026) 
 -0.001 
(0.039) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
-0.002 
(0.039) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.095*** 
(0.013) 
0.095*** 
(0.013) 
0.095*** 
(0.013) 
 0.055*** 
(0.016) 
0.055*** 
(0.016) 
0.054*** 
(0.016) 
Fixed assets to assets 0.411** 
(0.192) 
0.409** 
(0.192) 
0.449** 
(0.191) 
 1.574*** 
(0.484) 
1.576*** 
(0.485) 
1.633*** 
(0.482) 
Economic development 0.194*** 
(0.057) 
0.193*** 
(0.057) 
0.201*** 
(0.057) 
 0.854*** 
(0.130) 
0.858*** 
(0.132) 
0.85*** 
(0.129) 
Constant 28.12*** 
(5.469) 
28.22*** 
(5.477) 
26.36*** 
(5.316) 
 16.53** 
(7.298) 
16.38** 
(7.322) 
17.07** 
(7.250) 
N 825 825 825  471 471 471 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Wald chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000**** 
R2 0.417 0.417 0.4178  0.453 0.452 0.452 
F-test/GMM C stat. 26.52*** n.a. 25.71***  45.42*** n.a. 2.047 
Sargan/ Hansen's J test 2.392 n.a. 2.034  1.682 n.a. 1.877 
Basmann 2.341 2.341 n.a.  1.877 1.616 n.a. 
  
Panel B. Alternative estimation techniques and standard errors 
 Truncated Quantile White Bootstrap  Truncated Quantile White Bootstrap 
Model # [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Logarithm total assets -17.38*** 
(1.571) 
-1.008*** 
(0.294) 
-2.334*** 
(0.685) 
-2.33*** 
(0.586) 
 -12.37*** 
(4.300) 
-2.056*** 
(0.543) 
-3.148*** 
(0.769) 
-3.148*** 
(0.652) 
Earning to assets 
 
3.648*** 
(1.009) 
1.084*** 
(0.410) 
0.352** 
(0.137) 
0.352** 
(0.169) 
 2.579*** 
(0.915) 
1.062*** 
(0.195) 
0.454** 
(0.178) 
0.454** 
(0.193) 
Net loans to assets 
 
0.166 
(0.122) 
0.0255 
(0.0283) 
-0.00809 
(0.0299) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
 -0.122 
(0.143) 
-0.0371 
(0.0304) 
-0.0340 
(0.0532) 
-0.0340 
(0.0422) 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
0.231*** 
(0.049) 
0.120*** 
(0.0140) 
0.0404*** 
(0.0132) 
0.04*** 
(0.013) 
 0.054 
(0.033) 
0.0531*** 
(0.0157) 
0.0363** 
(0.0160) 
0.0363** 
(0.0164) 
Fixed assets to assets 3.512*** 
(0.714) 
0.960** 
(0.481) 
0.263 
(0.230) 
0.263 
(0.239) 
 5.045*** 
(1.891) 
1.848** 
(0.802) 
0.528 
(0.551) 
0.528 
(0.674) 
Economic development 3.015*** 
(0.281) 
0.297*** 
(0.0762) 
0.293*** 
(0.111) 
0.293*** 
(0.069) 
 1.733*** 
(0.631) 
0.533*** 
(0.110) 
0.542*** 
(0.147) 
0.542*** 
(0.104) 
Constant -24.99 
(27.43) 
-2.625 
(6.266) 
29.73*** 
(11.17) 
29.73*** 
(8.892) 
 56.89 
(42.19) 
6.557 
(6.817) 
30.17** 
(14.01) 
30.17** 
(12.60) 
N 807 862 862 862  433 472 472 472 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2 0.000*** n.a. 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** n.a. 0.000*** 0.000*** 
R2 n.a. 0.388 0.388 0.388  n.a. 0.43 0.436 0.436 
Sargan test is reported for 2SLS and LIML models while the Hansen J test is reported for the GMM model. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level 
and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. In panel B, we show results from heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (Models 3 
and 7) and standard errors based on bootstrapping techniques (100 random resamples) (Models 4 and 8).   
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Figures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.A Economic and financial development index for a sample of more than 100 Islamic banks in 28 countries. Panel A plots the 
average of the economic and the financial development index for the period between 1999 and 2013. The graph compares economic and 
financial development between USA, UK and the rest of countries where Islamic banks operate. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.B Bank capital ratios for a sample of more than 100 Islamic banks in 28 countries. The graph plots the average of the capital ratios 
defined as common equity to total assets (unregulated capital) and Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (regulated capital) for the period 
between 1999 and 2013.  
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